Boosting facility deliveries with results-based financing: a mixed-methods evaluation of the government midwifery incentive scheme in Cambodia by Por Ir et al.
RESEARCH ARTICLE Open Access
Boosting facility deliveries with results-based
financing: a mixed-methods evaluation of
the government midwifery incentive
scheme in Cambodia
Por Ir1*, Catherine Korachais2, Kannarath Chheng1, Dirk Horemans3, Wim Van Damme2
and Bruno Meessen2
Abstract
Background: Increasing the coverage of skilled attendance at births in a health facility (facility delivery) is crucial for
saving the lives of mothers and achieving Millennium Development Goal five. Cambodia has significantly increased
the coverage of facility deliveries and reduced the maternal mortality ratio in the last decade. The introduction of a
nationwide government implemented and funded results-based financing initiative, known as the Government
Midwifery Incentive Scheme (GMIS), is considered one of the most important contributors to this. We evaluated
GMIS to explore its effects on facility deliveries and the health system.
Methods: We used a mixed-methods design. An interrupted time series model was applied, using routine
longitudinal data on reported deliveries between 2006 and 2011 that were extracted from the health information
system. In addition, we interviewed 56 key informants and performed 12 focus group discussions with 124 women
who had given birth (once or more) since 2006. Findings from the quantitative data were carefully interpreted and
triangulated with those from qualitative data.
Results: We found that facility deliveries have tripled from 19 % of the estimated number of births in 2006 to 57 %
in 2011 and this increase was more substantial at health centres as compared to hospitals. Segmented linear
regressions showed that the introduction of GMIS in October 2007 made the increase in facility deliveries and
deliveries with skilled attendants significantly jump by 18 and 10 % respectively. Results from qualitative data also
suggest that the introduction of GMIS together with other interventions that aimed to improve access to essential
maternal health services led to considerable improvements in public health facilities and a steep increase in facility
deliveries. Home deliveries attended by traditional birth attendants decreased concomitantly. We also outline
several operational issues and limitations of GMIS.
Conclusions: The available evidence strongly suggests that GMIS is an effective mechanism to complement other
interventions to improve health system performance and boost facility deliveries as well as skilled birth attendance;
thereby contributing to the reduction of maternal mortality. Our findings provide useful lessons for Cambodia to
further improve GMIS and for other low-income countries to implement similar results-based financing
mechanisms.
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Background
Skilled attendance at birth is considered one of the most
critical interventions for ensuring safe motherhood [1]. In
addition to skilled attendance, it is important that mothers
give birth in an appropriate setting, e.g. a health facility,
where hygienic conditions, supplies and equipment can
help reduce risk of complications. Adequate transport and
effective communication systems for timely referral for
emergency obstetric care when complications arise is also
extremely important [2, 3]. However, in many low-income
countries, despite considerable national and global efforts
to improve safe motherhood services, the coverage of fa-
cility deliveries remains low and the rates of decline in
maternal mortality ratio, if any, are insufficient to achieve
Millennium Development Goal five (MDG 5) [4].
Cambodia has significantly increased the coverage of fa-
cility deliveries and reduced the maternal mortality ratio
in a relatively short-time span. The Cambodia Demo-
graphic and Health Surveys (CDHS) [5, 6] showed that
the coverage of facility deliveries rose from 22 % in 2005
to 54 % in 2010, whereas the maternal mortality ratio sig-
nificantly decreased from 473 (95 % CI: 338–605) to 206
(95 % CI: 124–288) maternal deaths per 100,000 live
births in the same period. This achievement resulted from
concerted efforts in strengthening the public health sys-
tem to supply essential reproductive and maternal health
services and to remove barriers to accessing these services
for pregnant women. The introduction of the Government
Midwifery Incentive Scheme (GMIS) was one of these ef-
forts [7, 8]. Implemented nationwide and funded by the
government, GMIS aimed to boost facility deliveries by
paying midwives and other trained health personnel with
cash incentives based on the number of live births they
attended in public health facilities—USD15 for a live birth
in a health centre and USD10 for a live birth in a referral
hospital. The reason for the higher payment in a health
centre compared to a hospital was to provide a stronger
incentive for deliveries at health centres—the largest pri-
mary health care network and the recommended place for
normal deliveries.
It is generally believed that linking payments with re-
sults or performance targets, commonly known as
results-based financing (RBF), can stimulate health pro-
viders and users to achieve the results or targets. This in
turn contributes to improving health system perform-
ance and health outcomes. RBF is defined as “a cash
payment or non-monetary transfer made to a national or
sub-national government, manager, provider, payer or
consumer of services after predefined results have been
attained and verified”. RBF includes a wide range of
approaches or groups of interventions that vary greatly
according to the objectives, the targeted behaviours (or
indicators), the entity receiving the reward and the type
and magnitude of the financial reward [9]. Some RBF
approaches in health focus on improving the provision
of health services (supply-side RBF) or on increasing the
uptake of health services (demand-side RBF), whereas
others address both supply and demand barriers (a
supply-side and demand-side mixed RBF). GMIS is a
form of supply-side RBF through which the government
links its budget funds to desired outputs, rather than just
financing inputs, which is commonly known as results-
based budgeting [10, 11]. Such supply-side RBF is often
implemented in combination with demand-side RBF,
such as conditional cash transfers [12–14].
Despite increasing evidence showing the positive effects
of RBF on health services utilization or coverage, whether
such strategy really helps improve health system perform-
ance and health outcomes, especially maternal and child
health, is still a greatly debated subject [10, 15–17]. A part
from its apparent positive effects, anecdotal evidence
shows that there are also limitations and pitfalls related to
the implementation of such schemes.
With a mixed-methods design, we conducted the first
evaluation of GMIS, with the aim of exploring the effects
of this scheme on deliveries attended by trained health
professionals in public health facilities (facility deliveries)
and possible spill-over effects on the whole health sys-
tem, mainly at the district level, and vice versa. It has
been argued that such system effects are important attri-
butes of RBF [16]. We also identified the limitations of
GMIS and possible challenges ahead. This assessment
help to fill the evidence gap and generate lessons for
Cambodia and other low-income countries contemplat-




Cambodia is a low-income country in the South-East Asian
region with a population of 14.3 million inhabitants, of
which 80 % live in rural areas, largely relying on agriculture.
According to the 2007 Cambodia Socio-Economic Survey,
30 % of the population live below the national poverty line
of USD0.59 per day [18]. Over the past decade, the country
has made substantial progress in improving the health of
the population, as evidenced by the changes in key health
indicators, especially reproductive, maternal and child
health indicators, reported in the Cambodian Demographic
and Health Surveys (CDHS) 2000, 2005, and 2010 (Table 1).
However, Cambodia’s health indicators remain relatively
low if compared with other countries in the region and are
inequitably distributed among different socio-economic
groups.
The Cambodian public health care system is composed
of operational health districts. Each health district has a
number of health centres and a referral hospital, respect-
ively providing first and second line health services to a
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population of 100,000-200,000. By 2011, there were
1,024 health centres providing primary health care and
79 referral hospitals in 77 health districts, providing a
reasonable physical coverage throughout the country
[19]. Next to this public sector, there is a thriving private
sector which firmly occupies the most lucrative seg-
ments of the health care market [20].
Since 1996, several reform initiatives have been under-
taken to improve access for the population to priority
public health services, especially maternal services. In
addition to human resource development and reforms,
Cambodia has been particularly creative in introducing
innovative health financing schemes. The major ones in-
clude ‘contracting’ and other performance-based finan-
cing schemes [21–23], health equity funds [24–30],
vouchers [8, 31], community-based health insurance,
and the Government Midwifery Incentive Scheme
(GMIS). Available evidence shows that these major health
financing schemes, in particular vouchers [31] have also
contributed to the increase in facility deliveries.
Study intervention—the Government Midwifery Incentive
Scheme
The Government Midwifery Incentive Scheme (GMIS) is
the most recent health financing scheme which specific-
ally addresses maternal health service challenges. It is a
supply-side results-based health financing mechanism
aimed at motivating skilled birth attendants to promote
deliveries in public health facilities (facility deliveries),
thereby contributing to the reduction of maternal mortal-
ity. The most remarkable feature of GMIS lies in the ‘G’:
the scheme is fully implemented by the Royal Government
of Cambodia with its own funds, straight nationwide. Low
remuneration of midwives which was increasingly recog-
nised as the main cause of low facility deliveries in
Cambodia triggered discussions among policy makers to
look for solution. The discussions resulted in an agree-
ment to upgrade the government salary scale for midwives
and provide them with cash incentives. This was publicly
announced by the Prime Minister in early 2007. Subse-
quently, the Ministry of Economy and Finance and the
Ministry of Health jointly issued a Prakas (directive) on 02
April 2007 to allocate government budget to provide in-
centives for midwives at an amount of USD15 for each live
birth attended in health centres and USD10 in hospitals
[32]. On 28 June 2007 the Ministry of Health issued a cir-
cular providing guidance on the implementation and
monitoring of GMIS [33]. The circular stipulated that be-
sides midwives, physicians and other trained health
personnel can also receive these incentives when attending
deliveries in public health facilities. Up to 30 % of the in-
centives have to be shared with other health personnel in
the facility and eventually with other people such as trad-
itional birth attendants who refer women to the facility for
delivery. The number of deliveries is reported monthly by
health facilities through the routine health information
system. The report must be signed by the director of the
health facility and, for health centres, also by the com-
mune chief. Based on the number of reported deliveries,
incentives are disbursed quarterly to the facilities through
public financial disbursement channels. GMIS became op-
erational nationwide in October 2007, when midwives and
other health personnel began to receive the incentives.
Study design
This is a retrospective impact evaluation that was con-
ducted in early 2012, more than four years after the start
of GMIS. In this study, we investigated: (i) whether and
to what extent GMIS contributes to increased facility de-
liveries and/or deliveries attended by trained health
personnel; (ii) whether GMIS contributed to improving
the district health system in terms of infrastructure,
availability and commitment of midwives and other
personnel, health service organisation at the facilities, re-
ferrals between villages, health centres and referral hos-
pitals, and health centre supervisions by the health
district; (iii) in which district health system context (e.g.
districts with and without other major health financing
interventions) GMIS was most effective; and (iv) the lim-
itations and pitfalls of GMIS, including its unintended
effects on the district health system.
These questions are different in nature and answers to
such questions thus require varied approaches to data
collection and analysis. Therefore, we used a mixed-
methods design, which allows collecting, analysing, and
interpreting quantitative and qualitative data in a single
Table 1 Maternal and child health related indicators
Indicators CDHS 2000 CDHS 2005 CDHS 2010
Children 12–23 months fully
vaccinated (%)
40 67 79
Use of modern contraceptive
method (%)
19 27 35
Antenatal care at least once
by trained personnel (%)
38 69 89
Deliveries in health facilities (%) 10 22 54
Deliveries assisted by trained
personnel (%)
32 44 71
Exclusive breastfeeding (%) 11 60 74
Total fertility rate 4.0 3.4 3.0
Infant mortality per 1,000 live
births
95 66 45
Under 5 mortality per 1,000
live births
124 83 54
Maternal mortality ratio per
100,000 live births
437 472 206
Source: CDHS Reports 2000, 2005 and 2010
CDHS means Cambodia Demographic and Health Survey
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study or in a series of studies that investigate the same
underlying phenomenon [34, 35]. Such approach is in-
creasingly used for impact evaluations [36]. In the ab-
sence of control data, we adopted an interrupted time
series design, one of the most robust quantitative
methods for impact evaluation [37], to analyse routine
longitudinal data extracted from the national health in-
formation system with the aim of assessing the impact
of GMIS on facility deliveries and associated outcome
variables. In addition, we collected qualitative data to fa-
cilitate the interpretation of the findings from this quan-
titative data analysis and to identify strengths and
limitations in design and implementation of GMIS.
Data collection
Quantitative data were extracted from the national health
information system on the monthly number of deliveries
attended by trained health personnel or skilled attendants
(in health centres, referral hospitals and at home) and the
monthly number of home deliveries attended by trad-
itional birth attendants, nationally and by health district,
between January 2006 and December 2011. These data are
routinely collected by individual health facilities and col-
lated at the district level in a specific software package on
a monthly basis. These reports are then sent to the provin-
cial health office, which in turn forwards them to the cen-
tral Ministry of Health. The expected number of births is
estimated based on the population figure counted by the
national census in 2008 with an annual growth rate of
1.54 % and a crude birth rate of 2.56 %.
In addition to the routine quantitative data, we also col-
lected qualitative data in six selected health districts.
These districts were selected based on the availability of
major health financing schemes such as contracting,
health equity funds and vouchers with the aim of covering
all aspects or groups of districts (with none, one or several
of these schemes). In each selected district, we interviewed
the district supervisor for maternal and child health ser-
vices and the chief of the technical bureau. These individ-
uals are considered to be the most informed about GMIS
and maternal health-related matters in the district. With
help from the supervisor, we selected two health centre-
s—one with relatively good delivery performance and an-
other one with relatively poor performance. In each
selected health centre, we interviewed midwives, the
health centre chief and one of the community representa-
tives. In addition, we conducted one focus group discus-
sion with randomly selected women who had given birth
(once or more) between 2006 and 2010 in each health
centre catchment area. Based on the health centre’s cover-
age map, we first selected three villages according to geo-
graphical distribution: one closest to the health centre,
one furthest away from the health centre and one in be-
tween. According to the village’s population size, in
each village 9–12 eligible women (who had given
birth between 2006 and 2010) were randomly selected
and invited to participate in a focus group discussion.
Moreover, in order to gain insights on GMIS policy,
its potential effects and issues related to its design,
implementation and monitoring, we conducted in-
depth interviews with policy makers and managers
from the Ministry of Health, development partners
and non-governmental organisations in the capital
city of Phnom Penh. They were purposively selected
based on authors’ prior knowledge and through a
snowball technique. We did not fix the number of
key informants in Phnom Penh, but continued the in-
terviews until we got an impression of saturation of
messages.
Table 2 summarizes the sampling and number of re-
spondents by location, type and method for qualitative
data collection. In total, we conducted 12 focus group
discussions with 124 women and interviewed 56 key in-
formants, including 11 in Phnom Penh. The interviews
with key informants in Phnom Penh were carried out by
the first author (PI) and third author (KC) of this paper
in both English and local languages, whereas the focus
group discussions and interviews at the district level
were conducted by two trained surveyors under close
supervision by PI. We had guiding questions for key in-
formant interviews and guidelines for focus group
discussions.
Data analysis
We first assessed the trends and changes in the propor-
tion of deliveries attended by trained health personnel
by location: in health centres, in referral hospitals and
at home. Then we conducted an econometric analysis
in order to assess the impact of GMIS. The absence of
a baseline and the one-time nationwide launching of
GMIS constrained us in terms of research design for
the measurement of the effectiveness of the GMIS.
Therefore, we used segmented linear regressions, as
recommended, for example, by Lagarde [38] to assess
the impact of GMIS. Authors of a recent Cochrane
Review on performance-based financing argue that this
method, although less robust, is still an acceptable
method to assess the impact of a policy change with
routine longitudinal data [15]. Our monthly data
allowed us to assess the effect of the GMIS introduc-
tion on the following outcomes: monthly number of
deliveries in public health facilities (facility deliveries)
in all health districts and by group of districts with and
without major health financing schemes; monthly vol-
ume of deliveries attended by trained health personnel
(including home deliveries). The specification of the
linear regression to be analysed was:
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Y t ¼ β0 þ β1:t þ β2:interventiont þ β3:postslopet þ εt
ð1Þ
Yt is the outcome variable at time t. Time is a continu-
ous variable indicating time from the start of the study
up to the end of the period of observation; intervention
is coded 0 for pre-intervention time points and 1 for
post-intervention time points (after October 2007); and
postslope is coded 0 up to the last point before the inter-
vention phase and coded sequentially from 1 thereafter.
In this model, β0 captures the baseline level of the out-
come at time 0 (beginning of the period); β1 estimates
the structural trend or growth rate in utilisation, inde-
pendently from the intervention; β2 estimates the imme-
diate impact of the intervention on the outcome of
interest (or the change in the level in the outcome of
interest after the intervention); and β3 reflects the
change in trend, or growth rate in outcome, after the
intervention. We controlled for auto-correlation in the
data series, by first performing a Durbin–Watson (DW)
test to test the presence of first-order auto-correlation.
The presence of first auto-correlation violates the ordin-
ary least squares (OLS) assumption that the error terms
are uncorrelated, meaning that the standard-errors and
Table 2 Sampling and number of respondents by location, type and method for qualitative data collection
Location Health financing interventions Number of respondents by type and method
In-depth interviews Focus group discussions
OD1 Contracting; health equity fund;
vouchers and community-based
health insurance
1 OD MCH supervisor 2 focus group discussions
with 24 women
1 OD chief of the technical bureau
2 health centre chiefs
2 health centre midwives
2 community representatives
OD2 Contracting; health equity fund;
vouchers
1 OD MCH supervisor 2 focus group discussions
with 19 women
1 OD chief of the technical bureau
2 health centre chiefs
2 health centre midwives
2 community representatives
OD3 Contracting; health equity fund 1 OD MCH supervisor 2 focus group discussions
with 18 women
2 health centre chiefs
2 health centre midwives
2 community representatives
OD4 Health equity fund 1 OD MCH supervisor 2 focus group discussions
with 24 women
2 health centre chiefs




1 OD MCH supervisor 2 focus group discussions
with 18 women
1 OD chief of the technical bureau
2 health centre chiefs
2 health centre midwives
2 community representatives
OD6 None 1 MCH supervisor 2 focus group discussions
with 21 women
2 health centre chiefs
2 health centre midwives
2 community representatives
Phnom Penh Not applicable 11 policy makers and managers: 6 from
the Ministry of Health and 5 from
development partners and NGOs
TOTAL 56 key informants 12 focus group discussions
with 124 women
MCH means maternal and child health, OD means operational district
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p-values are biased with the OLS estimator. The DW










where T is the number of observations. The value of
DW always lies between 0 and 4; DW = 2 indicates no
autocorrelation. Small values of DW indicate that suc-
cessive error terms are, on average, close in value to one
another, or positively correlated.
Since auto-correlation was detected for all our four
outcomes (DW < 1), the Prais–Winsten generalized least
squares estimator [39] was used to estimate the regres-
sion. STATA 12 was used to perform all the estimates.
The qualitative data were manually coded and key
messages were grouped by theme and by research ques-
tion and analysed by group of districts. Findings from
the analysis of qualitative data were carefully interpreted
and triangulated with quantitative data analysis.
Ethical considerations
This study received ethical approval from the National
Ethics Committee for Health Research in Cambodia on
02 April 2012 with reference number 040 NECHR.
The interviews were carried out by trained and profes-
sional surveyors. Prior to the interview, verbal consent
was obtained from the interviewee. All the personal in-
formation of the interviewees has been kept confiden-
tial and no name has been used for the report or
published papers.
Results
Results from descriptive analysis
Table 3 provides an overview of the proportion of annu-
ally reported deliveries by type of attendants (trained
health personnel and traditional birth attendants) and by
location (in health centres, in hospitals and at home) be-
tween 2006 and 2011. It shows that deliveries in public
health facilities (facility deliveries) increased sharply
from 18.9 % of the estimated number of birth in 2006 to
56.7 % in 2011. The increase in the proportion of deliv-
eries in health centres (from 11.3 to 42.4 %) was much
more substantial than in hospitals (from 7.6 to 14.3 %),
while attended deliveries at home decreased from 21.1
to 14.8 % within the same period. This amounted to an
overall increase in the proportion of facility deliveries by
200.1 % (275.4 % in health centres and 88.4 % in hospi-
tals) and a decline in proportion of attended home deliv-
eries by 30.1 % over this six-year period. Consequently,
the proportion of deliveries attended by trained health
personnel in all locations also increased by 78.6 % in the
same period (from 40 % in 2006 to 71.5 % in 2011). The
proportion of deliveries attended by traditional birth
attendants declined dramatically from 29.3 % in 2006 to
5.4 % in 2011, resulting in a total decrease of 81.5 %
between 2006 and 2011.
The magnitude of annual change in proportion of fa-
cility deliveries jumped from 29.6 % between 2006 and
2007 to 42.5 % between 2007 and 2008, and then grad-
ually slowed until 4.1 % between 2010 and 2011. In
health centres, we found a similar pattern –a jump from
44 to 59.2 % and then a gradual decline until 1.5 %. Un-
like in health centres, the magnitude of annual change
in hospital deliveries progressively increased from 6.9 %
between 2006 and 2007 to 20.9 % between 2009 and
Table 3 Proportion of deliveries by type of attendants and location between 2006 and 2011




Year In health centres In hospitals In public facilities At home All
(1) (2) (1) + (2) (3) (1) + (2) + (3)
Deliveries as % of expected
births in
2006 11.3 7.6 18.9 21.1 40.0 29.3
2007 16.4 8.1 24.5 21.6 46.1 26.7
2008 26.4 8.9 35.3 18.3 53.1 20.7
2009 35.6 10.5 46.1 18.1 64.2 14.9
2010 41.8 12.7 54.5 14.8 69.3 9.5
2011 42.4 14.3 56.7 14.8 71.5 5.4
% of change between 2006–2007 44.8 6.9 29.6 2.4 15.2 −9.0
2007–2008 59.2 8.8 42.5 −15.6 15.2 −22.3
2008–2009 36.7 18.9 32.2 −0.8 20.9 −27.9
2009–2010 17.3 20.9 18.1 −18.1 7.9 −36.7
2010–2011 1.5 12.7 4.1 −0.4 3.2 −42.6
2006–2011 275.4 88.4 200.1 −30.1 78.6 −81.5
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2010 and then sharply declined to 12.7 % between 2010
and 2011. The magnitude of annual change in propor-
tion of deliveries at home was variable.
Results from segmented linear regressions
All models were run using an OLS estimator. The
Durbin-Watson test statistic showed that there was first
order auto-correlation (D-W test <1), meaning that the
observations were positively correlated from one month
to another; this violates the non-autocorrelation of resid-
uals assumption, which leads to biased standard errors
with the OLS estimator. In order to address this issue,
we then performed the models using the Prais-Winsten
generalized least squares estimator [39], which corrected
the autocorrelation issue (D-W tests are then around 2).
Overall, the use of this estimator slightly reduced the
level and significance of the coefficients compared to the
OLS one. The results described below and summarised
in Table 4 all refer to the Prais-Winsten estimates.
Model (1) in column one was performed on the data of
19 health districts which had no other major health finan-
cing scheme, such as contracting, health equity funds,
vouchers, etc. The coefficient of the constant indicates
that at the beginning of the period of observation, in this
sub-region of Cambodia, there were on average 611
facility deliveries per month (p-value <0.01). There was a
significant upward trend with an average of 36 more facil-
ity deliveries each month (p-value <0.01). Model (1) also
shows that immediately after the intervention, the number
of facility deliveries increased suddenly and significantly
by 490 deliveries per month (p-value <0.01), but there was
no significant change in the month-to-month trend
(p-value >0.1). According to this data, the number of facil-
ity deliveries in October 2007 (the first month after the
start of the intervention) was around 1,897, while it would
have been 1,408 without the intervention, suggesting an
increase in facility deliveries by 35 % the first month. Simi-
larly, we estimate that the number of facility deliveries
12 months after the intervention was around 27 % higher
than it would have been without the intervention.
Figure 1a presents the raw data series of the outcome of
interest, and the fitted results obtained from Model (1).
Model (2) was performed on the data of the other
58 health districts which had at least one other major
health financing scheme. The coefficient of the con-
stant indicates that at the beginning of the period of
observation, there were on average 3,710 facility deliv-
eries per month (p-value <0.01). There was a signifi-
cant upward trend with an average of 93 more facility
deliveries each month (p-value <0.01). Immediately
Table 4 Impact of results-based financing on location and assistance of deliveries: Results from the segmented linear regression models
Dependent variable Facility deliveries in districts with
no other major financing scheme
Facility deliveries in districts with one
or more other major financing scheme
Facility deliveries
in all districts
All deliveries by trained
health personnel in all
districts
Number of health districts 19 58 77 77
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)




Time(month) 36.235*** 93.407*** 132.135*** 125.913***
(20.380–52.090) (47.549–139.264) (70.328–193.942) (53.338–198.488)
GMIS Intervention 489.685*** 912.637*** 1,330.918*** 1,260.934**
(219.206–760.163) (306.590–1,518.685) (488.316–2,173.519) (181.964–2,339.903)
GMIS postslope −1.307 83.973** 80.773* 54.600
(−19.326–16.712) (16.035–151.911) (−5.097–166.644) (−45.848–155.049)
Observations 72 72 72 72
R-squared 0.792 0.732 0.740 0.624
Durbin Watson original 0.985 0.688 0.711 0.792
Durbin Watson
transformed
2.043 1.898 1.909 1.940
all regressions are using a Prais–Winsten estimator that corrects for data auto-correlation; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1; confidence intervals (CI) in parentheses.
Time variable is a sequence starting at 1 for the first month of the dataset (January 2006) to 72 for the last month (Dec 2011), its coefficient provides the secular trend
of deliveries. GMIS Intervention and GMIS postslope are the level and trend variables for an intervention starting in October 2007: their coefficients represent respectively
the change in level and the change in trend of deliveries after the introduction of GMIS. Other major health financing schemes include contracting and other
performance-based financing, health equity funds, vouchers and community-based health insurance. R-Squared gives information about the goodness of fit of the
model, the closer to 1, the better the data fit the model. Durbin-Watson (DW) statistic tests the presence of first-order auto-correlation. The presence of first auto-
correlation violates the ordinary least squares (OLS) assumption that the error terms are uncorrelated, meaning that the standard-errors and p-values are biased with
the OLS estimator. DW ‘original’ tests the presence of first-order auto-correlation with the OLS estimator, while DW ‘transformed’ tests it with the Prais-Winsten estimator.
A value around 2 indicates no sign of auto-correlation. P-values and CI are based on a standard variance estimator.
Ir et al. BMC Pregnancy and Childbirth  (2015) 15:170 Page 7 of 15
after the intervention, the number of facility deliveries
increased suddenly and significantly by 913 deliveries
per month (p-value <0.01), followed by an upward
trend of 84 deliveries each month (p-value <0.05). Ac-
cording to this data, the number of facility deliveries
in October 2007 (the first month after the start of
the intervention) was around 8,713, while it would
have been 6,793 without the intervention, suggesting
an increase of facility deliveries by 17 % the first
month. Similarly, we estimate that the number of
facility deliveries 12 months after the intervention
was around 28 % higher than it would have been
without the intervention. Figure 1b presents the raw
data series of the outcome of interest, and the fitted
results obtained from Model (2).
Model (3) provides estimates for the two groups of dis-
tricts put together. Results indicate that at the beginning
of the period of observation, there were on average 4,316
facility deliveries per month in Cambodia (p-value <0.01).
There was a significant upward trend with an average of
132 more facility deliveries each month (p-value <0.01).
Immediately after the intervention, the number of facility
deliveries increased suddenly and significantly by about
1,331 deliveries per month (p-value <0.01). According to
this data, the number of facility deliveries in October 2007
(the first month after the start of the intervention) was
around 8,554, while it would have been 7,223 without the
intervention, suggesting an increase of facility deliveries by
more than 18.4 %. Similarly, we estimate that the number
of facility deliveries 12 months after the intervention was
around 15.4 % higher than it would have been without the
intervention. Figure 1c presents the raw data series of the
outcome of interest, and the fitted results obtained from
Model (3).
Model (4) allows us to also consider deliveries
attended by trained health personnel at home. Results in-
dicate that at the beginning of the period of observation,
there were on average 10,367 deliveries by trained health
personnel per month in Cambodia (p-value <0.01), with a
significant upward trend of 126 more deliveries each
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month (p-value <0.01). Immediately after the intervention,
the number of deliveries by trained health personnel in-
creased suddenly and significantly by 1,261 deliveries—a
jump of 9.6 and 8.7 % at the first and 12th month respect-
ively after the introduction of GMIS. Figure 1d presents
the raw data series of the outcome of interest, and the fit-
ted results (dash line) obtained from Model (4).
We also ran segmented linear regressions on other
outcome variables, including number of referrals of
complicated deliveries from health centres to hospitals
and results are available on request. Robustness checks
were performed in order to check the reliability of these
results. The linear relationship assumption between our
outcomes and time was checked by adding a time-
squared variable: it appeared to be not significant, con-
firming the linearity hypothesis. A model without trend
effect (i.e. without the postslope variable as an explain-
ing variable) ensures that there is a positive shift on the
level of facility deliveries at the time GMIS was imple-
mented. Placebo models, the models in which the inter-
vention date was set at fake dates (one year before, two
years after), confirm that the changes occurred concomi-
tantly with the GMIS introduction. Models controlling
for seasonal effects were also performed.
Results from qualitative data analysis
Results from key informant interviews
The qualitative research corroborates the findings of the
quantitative analyses. All the key informants stated that
GMIS is a good government health policy and investment.
They noted a dramatic increase in facility deliveries after
the introduction of GMIS. A key informant, an expert in
the field of maternal and child health, stressed that:
“GMIS is a fantastic and very powerful policy. It has
dramatically changed the delivery pattern in
Cambodia. There has been a remarkable increase in
deliveries in public health facilities, mainly in health
centres. Giving birth in public health facilities rose
from 11 % in 2000 to 60 % in 2010. Now, many health
centres have around 20–25 deliveries per month.
Before the introduction of GMIS, there was almost no
case of delivery in many health centres. I have never
seen any other countries with such incredible change.
If you look at the data by year, you will see so
beautiful increase. There is probably no example like
this in the world…”
Their statements are consistent with the theory of
change underlying the GMIS policy. Incentives increase
the income of midwives and other health personnel, and
consequently their motivation and commitment to in-
crease facility deliveries. Thanks to the incentives, mid-
wives have changed their behaviour and practice from
promoting home deliveries to promoting deliveries in
public health facilities. Health centre midwives reported
that they now prefer attending deliveries at the health
centre, as attending home deliveries is more time con-
suming than health centre deliveries and is sometimes
risky. Moreover, home deliveries do not necessarily gen-
erate more income than what they can earn from health
centre deliveries. One midwife said:
“Since I received the incentives (from GMIS), I have
stopped attending deliveries at home. When I am
asked by the woman or her family to do so, I will ask
her or the family to bring her to the health centre. For
home deliveries, I often have to go to the woman’s
home, which is much more time consuming than
waiting for the woman at the health centre and
sometimes unsecured for me to travel at night time to
woman’s home. Moreover, at home, I have to bear the
risk and liability, whereas at the health centre, it is the
collective responsibility. I used to get around USD15-
USD20 per home delivery (which is sometimes difficult
to get paid), which is comparable with what I earn
from attending a delivery at the health centre—about
USD10 from the GMIS plus user fees…”
According to key informants in the six health districts,
especially the district maternal and child health supervi-
sors and chiefs of the technical bureau, GMIS not only
increased facility deliveries and changed midwife behav-
iour and practices, but also triggered other changes at
district and facility level. District and provincial health
management teams seized the opportunity of midwives
receiving incentives for delivery to reinforce their super-
visions over health facilities especially for delivery
services in order to prevent eventual falsification of re-
ported cases. During the supervision, the delivery moni-
toring grid and signature of the commune chief was
strictly checked for each reported facility delivery. Some
even asked their respective health facilities to make deliv-
ery services free of charge (yet, we did not find this prac-
tice in the six health districts we investigated).
At health facility level, more attention has been paid
to the reorganisation and improvement of delivery ser-
vices. In a large majority of health centres, especially
those with other major health financing schemes, 24-
hour and seven-day-a-week services for delivery were
put in place. They also organised on-call services out-
side working hours and at the weekend by posting cell-
phone numbers of midwives at the health centre or
distributing them to women directly or through com-
munity health workers. It is now common that health
centre midwives share their cellphone numbers with
pregnant women during antenatal care and ask the
women to call them when labour starts. Many health
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centres reported to have hired midwife assistant(s) to
ensure the continuity of services. It was also reported
that some health centres provided an in-kind incentive
such as “Sarong” (Cambodian commonly used skirt) to
clients in order to attract more pregnant women to de-
liver at the health centres.
All health centres reported to have shared part of the
income from GMIS (between 30–50 %) with other
personnel and provided cash incentives to traditional
birth attendants and community health workers for re-
ferrals of pregnant women for delivery in their facilities.
The amount of incentives often varied from USD1.25 to
USD2.50 per referred case. This amount was found simi-
lar to what traditional birth attendants would earn from
attending a home delivery. It was reported that in one
health district, the health authority collaborated with
commune councils to forbid traditional birth attendants
to attend deliveries at home. For any home delivery
attended by traditional birth attendants, if discovered,
the responsible traditional birth attendants would get a
USD25 fine and the money is put into the account of
the commune.
In addition to the increased facility deliveries, almost
all health centres also reported an increase in family
planning services, antenatal care and postnatal care
visits. In some health centres, even general outpatient
consultations were also found to have increased consid-
erably after the introduction of GMIS. This was mainly
thanks to the increased availability and the commitment
of midwives to their work and the overall improvement
in the health centre.
Many key informants emphasized that the positive ef-
fects, especially the increased facility deliveries, were not
entirely attributable to GMIS. Other factors including ef-
forts in improving health infrastructure, equipment and
supplies necessary for delivery services, and in training
and capacity building of midwives and their deployment,
also contributed to the improved health facility perform-
ance in general, and to increased facility deliveries. A na-
tional expert informed us that nearly one third of the
health centres in Cambodia had no trained midwife; this
number gradually decreased until the end of 2009 when
all the health centres in the country had at least one
trained midwife. At the same time, the number of basic
and comprehensive emergency obstetric care facilities
increased significantly. Moreover, many key informants
expressed their view that the expansion of coverage of
major health financing schemes such as contracting,
health equity funds and vouchers was an important fac-
tor contributing to improving staff and facility perform-
ance, and hence, increased facility deliveries.
Along with the positive effects, some negative effects
and limitations of GMIS were raised by key informants.
Some shared anecdotal evidence and their concerns that
in some health districts, especially those with no other
major health financing schemes, there was no proper
supervision and monitoring. In those districts, health
facilities might over-report the number of facility deliv-
eries or report home deliveries as facility deliveries. They
might also pay commune chiefs to obtain their signa-
tures. Possible delay in referrals of complicated cases
from health centres to referral hospitals was also raised
by some key informants in Phnom Penh, as the health
centre would lose the incentive if they referred the preg-
nant woman to hospital. But this concern was rejected
by almost all key informants at district and health centre
level. They argued that the incentives of intentionally
delaying referrals of complicated cases are not compar-
able to the risk of killing the woman, which is inhuman
and intolerable. It was reported that in some health dis-
tricts, some non-governmental organisations provide in-
centives to health centres for referrals of complicated
cases to hospitals and introduced a number of measures
for ensuring appropriate and timely referrals, including
strengthening the monitoring system and ambulance
services. Last but not least, almost all midwives and
health centre chiefs interviewed complained about delay
and incompleteness in disbursements of the incentives.
The delay varies from two months to two quarters, and
the cuts of the incentives at district and provincial level,
for a number of reasons which could not be explained,
were ranging from 10 to 20 % of the total revenues,
depending on the context.
Results from focus group discussions with women
The increased facility deliveries and improved health fa-
cility performance were further confirmed by the women
who participated in focus group discussions. They re-
ported that almost all pregnant women in their villages,
especially those in the districts with other major health
financing schemes, are now giving birth at health cen-
tres. Some women with complicated pregnancy, those
living closer to referral hospitals and those living far
from hospitals but are willing and able to pay a higher
cost go to hospitals for delivery. Some women declared
that there is no more home delivery in their villages.
This situation had gradually changed over a number of
years and for a number of reasons: (i) public health facil-
ities, mainly health centres in their areas, are in general
performing better than they were some years ago; they
are better equipped and cleaner; midwives are friendlier
and more present, and if not present, can be easily called
when needed; (ii) in some villages there are no trad-
itional birth attendants, and if there are, they do not
want to attend deliveries anymore, as they have been
told not to attend delivery at home, but to refer preg-
nant women to health centres for which they will receive
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fair compensation; and (iii) women are increasingly
aware of the benefits of giving birth in health centres
and the risks of giving birth at home with traditional
birth attendants, as a participant reported:
“Giving birth in health centres has a lot of advantages.
We believe that giving birth in a health centre is safer
than doing so at home with traditional birth
attendants, as midwives are better trained and more
skilful than traditional birth attendants. In the health
centre, there are more modern equipment and
materials for delivery than at home. We can get our
baby vaccinated after the delivery at the health centre;
and it is easy to get a birth certificate for the baby. In
case of difficult delivery, we can get help for referral to
the hospital…”
However, it was reported that for a number of reasons a
small proportion of women still continue to deliver at
home and sometimes with traditional birth attendants.
One commonly reported reason was the fact that some
pregnant women were not well prepared for delivery, and
when it happened, it was too late to go to a health facility,
and thus the babies spontaneously came out at home or
on the way to the health facility. Other reasons were trans-
portation, financial barriers and intra-household con-
straints. Women did not report any case of midwives
asking for extra payments, but many of them reported to
have paid extra as an act of gratitude or gratefulness to
midwives for helping them deliver safely, as delivery is
considered one of the most important and dangerous
events in women’s lives, and therefore, traditionally named
as Chhlang Tonle (crossing the river).
Discussion
This study investigated four research questions through a
mixed-methods design to primarily evaluate the impact of
GMIS, a nationwide government implemented results-
based financing scheme aiming at boosting facility deliver-
ies in Cambodia.
The first question was whether the GMIS scheme did
reach its objective. We had two constraints in carrying
out the impact evaluation: (i) the availability of routine
data only and (ii) the fact that the nationwide introduc-
tion of the scheme deprived us from any robust counter-
factual. On the first point, we cannot exclude that one of
the unintended effects of GMIS was to incentivise staff
to over-report facility deliveries or at least to better re-
port them. However, the similarity between the propor-
tion of reported facility deliveries and deliveries attended
by trained health personnel in 2010 in the routine data
as indicated in Table 3 (55 and 69 % respectively) and
those found by the population-based CDHS 2010 as
shown in Table 1 (54 and 71 % respectively) seems to
indicate that this problem has been marginal. Moreover,
the quality of routine data, especially for maternal and
child health indicators, has significantly improved since
2006 [40, 41]. On the second point, we cannot exclude
that other concomitant phenomena also contributed to
the sharp increase in the number of facility deliveries and
deliveries by trained health personnel. Many key infor-
mants spontaneously mentioned that the rapid progress in
Cambodia with regards to reducing maternal mortality is
the outcome of a multifaceted strategy, as found by a re-
cent study [42]. Still, the coefficients of the regressions are
strongly significant. The interrupted time series analyses
confirm the pre-existing view—shared by all our infor-
mants—that GMIS did significantly help with the overall
country strategy to improve health system performance
and boost facility deliveries, and consequently, deliveries
attended by trained health personnel.
Although the interrupted time series is considered an
acceptable method to assess the impact of a policy
change with routine longitudinal data, this approach has
an obvious limitation. While it can confirm a shift in the
outcome variable, at and after the implementation of the
intervention, and can even give its magnitude, it does
not guarantee that the intervention was the causal deter-
minant of that shift. Concomitant reforms or events
might also have had an influence on the assessed out-
come variable. Our complementary qualitative insights
helped us to interpret the quantitative results and thus
minimized limitations of the latter.
As a result of our qualitative analysis, we also have a bet-
ter view on what happened in the ‘black box’. The narra-
tive report by key informants was that incentives
increased the income of midwives and other health
personnel, and consequently their motivation and com-
mitment to deliveries in public health facilities. Thanks to
the incentives, midwives have changed their behaviour
and practice from promoting home deliveries to promot-
ing facility deliveries. This positive change after the intro-
duction of GMIS was further evidenced by 124 women
who had given birth (once or more) since 2006 and partic-
ipated in the focus group discussions. They reported that
now most pregnant women in their villages go to health
centres for deliveries. Key informants also gave us some
insights into other factors which may have contributed to
the increased facility deliveries: they mentioned improve-
ment of health infrastructure, equipment and supplies ne-
cessary for delivery services, efforts in training and
capacity building of midwives and their deployment, as
evidenced by the considerable decline in number of health
centres with no trained midwife from 223 in 2006 to zero
by 2009. In addition, the expansion of coverage of major
health financing interventions such as contracting, health
equity funds and vouchers was also considered an import-
ant factor contributing to improving staff and facility
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performance, as pointed out by Liljestrand and Sambath
[7]. A recent study confirmed the impact of reproductive
vouchers on facility deliveries in Cambodia [31].
A second question was concerned with the possible
spill-over effects of GMIS. Our research, the qualitative
work in particular, gives some insights. As demonstrated
by the statements of key informants in the six selected
health districts, the introduction of GMIS not only in-
creased facility deliveries and deliveries by trained health
personnel and influenced midwives’ behaviour and prac-
tices, but also triggered other changes at district and fa-
cility level. These included improved supervisions and
monitoring from district and provincial teams over their
respective health facilities, mainly on maternal and child
health related activities; better organised health services
with often 24-hour and seven-day-a-week services (or at
least on-call) for delivery; better teamwork among staff
who fairly share incentives and related tasks among
them; and improved referrals of pregnant women from
villages to health centres for delivery by providing edu-
cation and incentives to traditional birth attendants and
community health workers. Thanks to this overall im-
provement, almost all health centres reported an in-
crease in family planning services, antenatal care and
postnatal care visits. In some health centres, even gen-
eral outpatient consultations were also found to have in-
creased considerably after the introduction of GMIS.
According to the results from segmented linear regres-
sions, the introduction of GMIS appears to also have a
positive effect on referrals of complicated deliveries from
health centres to hospitals. Although many key infor-
mants considered key interventions and strategies
highlighted in the ‘Fast Track Initiative’ as key factors
contributing to improved staff and facility performance
and increased deliveries in public health facilities; some
saw these as being an indirect result of the introduction
of GMIS. Many of these interventions and strategies, in-
cluding the Fast Track Initiative itself, were developed or
intensified after the introduction of GMIS to make this
policy sufficiently successful to achieve MDG 5.
The third question related to the possibility that the
effectiveness of GMIS varies across district health sys-
tems. The comparison between Models (1) and (2) indi-
cates that GMIS had a stronger short term effect in
districts with no other major financing scheme. As time
goes by, however, this advantage seems to vanish, as dis-
tricts with another major financing scheme have a
steeper slope. This was further explained by results from
key informant interviews. Changes in health service or-
ganisation (e.g. 24-h services) which is key to increased
facility deliveries, tends to happen more in health dis-
tricts with contracting whereas stronger monitoring and
supervision were seen in districts with a third party
purchaser for other contracting, health equity funds,
vouchers and community-based health insurance than in
those without such arrangements. According to women
participating in the focus group discussions, in health
districts with long-lasting and multiple external support,
including those with other major health financing
schemes, there are almost no women giving birth at
home with traditional birth attendants. This was not the
case in health districts without such interventions, espe-
cially for disadvantaged health centres (remote and poor
leadership). This stronger effect of GMIS in health
districts with other major health financing schemes
strongly suggests their complementarity and synergy.
Our last question was related to the possible shortcom-
ings or undesirable side-effects of the GMIS. According to
the literature, an output-based or performance-based
incentive scheme like GMIS can also have negative or un-
desirable effects, including distortions, gaming or fraud.
Financial incentives may be stolen or misused or cause
recipients to undermine or ignore unrewarded tasks.
Some providers may only show changes in reporting
(improving or falsifying figures) without necessarily chan-
ging practices. Furthermore, this approach can increase
dependency on financial incentives, dilute professionals’
intrinsic motivation, lead to demoralization due to feelings
of injustice, and can increase the administrative burden
and costs due to bureaucratisation [10, 17, 43].
Some key informants in Phnom Penh shared anecdotal
evidence and their concerns that in some health dis-
tricts, especially in the districts with no third party pur-
chaser, there was no proper supervision and monitoring.
In these districts, health facilities might over-report the
number of facility deliveries or report home deliveries as
facility deliveries. They might also pay commune chiefs
to obtain their signatures. However, our study did not
find any evidence on this. As discussed above, the
consistency of the routine data over the study period
and its comparability with the CDHS 2010 data suggests
that the over-reporting of delivery cases by health facil-
ities, if any, is negligible.
Possible delay in referrals of complicated cases from
health centres to referral hospitals was also raised by
some key informants in Phnom Penh, as health centre
midwives would not receive the incentive if they referred
the woman to hospital. But this concern was rejected by
almost all key informants at health district and health
centre level. Only one maternal and child health super-
visor said she observed a tendency to keep difficult cases
at one health centre in her district, but after explanation
and discussion with midwives there, things have now
changed. Moreover, our regressions show a positive up-
ward trend of monthly number of referrals of compli-
cated deliveries after the introduction of GMIS. Positive
results have been observed from the pilot experience
in many health districts in Banteay Meanchey and
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Battanabang provinces where the introduction of incen-
tives together with improved monitoring and an ambu-
lance for referrals have led to an increase in appropriate
and timely referrals of complicated deliveries to hospi-
tals. These results have led some key informants from
NGOs to strongly suggest that the government should
consider paying incentives for such referrals if GMIS is
to be continued. However, one can argue that such in-
centives alone will not address the problem of delay in
referrals, if any, without other accompanying measures
such as improved monitoring and ambulances. In the
absence of effective monitoring, such incentives can also
lead to over-referrals because it is theoretically easier for
a midwife to refer a pregnant woman to a referral hos-
pital and get the incentive rather than keeping the
woman to deliver at the health centre. Nevertheless,
technically it could be good to introduce the incentives
and other necessary measures for ensuring appropriate
referrals of complicated deliveries from health centres to
referral hospitals if the government is willing and able to
do so. The is because the reported referrals as percent-
age of total reported facility deliveries in Cambodia (the
highest rate was about 7 % in 2011), remains low as
compared to a general estimate that around 15 % of
all pregnant women might develop a potentially life-
threatening complication [44]. However, such an in-
centive system should be closely monitored to prevent
unnecessary referrals.
Another common concern is that excessive increase in
institutional deliveries can lead to an increase in un-
necessary C-sections. We did not investigate this issue
as it is beyond the scope of this study. However, the
current C-section rate in Cambodia, despite an increas-
ing trend, remains at around 4 % of the total number of
reported institutional deliveries.
Some key informants even said that providing incen-
tives to midwives for facility deliveries could undermine
their attention to other services, especially family plan-
ning. To increase the number of deliveries, it is better to
have fewer women using modern contraceptive methods.
However, as discussed above, interviews with key infor-
mants at health district and health centre level rather
found the opposite.
Last but not least, almost all midwives and health
centre chiefs interviewed complained that late and in-
complete disbursement of the incentives was common.
The delay varied from two months to two quarters, and
cuts at district and provincial levels ranged from 10 to
20 % of the total revenues, depending on the context. If
GMIS is to be continued, further improvement in incen-
tive disbursement is needed.
We believe that our findings, with their strengths and
limitations, are quite consistent with the current state of
knowledge on RBF in low-income countries. The most
remarkable fact is that our study confirms that RBF
seems to work very well with respect to institutional de-
liveries, a finding already observed in several African
countries such as Rwanda [45] and Burundi [46]. This
could indicate that in many low-income countries, the
low institutionalisation of deliveries is not only the result
of demand-side barriers (e.g. user fees, distance, limited
education of women…), but also stemming from supply
side barriers.
Conclusions
Despite some weaknesses in the methods, our findings
strongly suggest that GMIS is an effective mechanism to
complement other interventions to improve health sys-
tem performance and boost deliveries by trained health
personnel in public health facilities, especially at health
centres, thereby contributing to the reduction of mater-
nal mortality. In addition to the findings on the positive
impact of GMIS, this study also highlighted a number of
strengths and limitations of this scheme, including the
context and other factors that make it function effect-
ively. These factors provide useful lessons for Cambodia
to further improve GMIS and for other developing
countries to implement similar output-based financing
mechanisms.
The introduction of GMIS in late 2007 together with
other efforts to remove supply and demand barriers to
professional maternal health services, has led to consid-
erable improvements in public health facilities and a
steep increase in institutional and assisted deliveries.
GMIS is no doubt a key factor contributing to this
achievement, but the real extent of its contribution can-
not be assessed. A part from the GMIS, other interven-
tions such as the rapid expansion of midwife coverage to
all health centres; improvement of continuum of care for
mothers, newborns and children; improvement of refer-
ral system; development of delivery waiting rooms at
health centres in rural areas; and the expansion of con-
tracting, health equity funds and vouchers are also con-
tributing to this major change.
Besides the positive effects, GMIS has several oper-
ational issues and limitations that need to be addressed.
Improving the financial incentive disbursement and
monitoring system is crucial for the effectiveness of this
output-based financing scheme. Careful implementation
of such a scheme, as part of a broader package of health
care reforms aimed at improving access to skilled birth
attendants and emergency obstetric care, as indicated in
the Ministry of Health’s Fast Track Initiative, could help
address the limitations of GMIS. It could also improve
its effectiveness in complementing other interventions to
reach the ultimate goal of reducing maternal mortality
and thus achieving MDG 5. As emphasized by key
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informants, GMIS reflects the strong commitment of
the Royal Government of Cambodia to MDG 5 and such
commitment should be continued and maintained. The
comprehensiveness of the safe motherhood strategy of
Cambodia could also be a source of inspiration for other
low-income countries.
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